Obstruction & Resisting Arrest

Estimated reading time: 25 minutes

Let’s take a look at defending against criminal charges of Interference or Obstruction of Legal Process and Resisting Arrest in Minnesota. First, note that these are not malum in se crimes, but are rather Public Order crimes. The purpose of these criminal statutes is to encourage compliance with the lawful commands of law enforcement officers, and discourage violence. Of course, many problems can arise.

To begin, we examine the Minnesota Statute defining the Obstructing Legal Process and Arrest crime:

Subd. 1. Crime. Whoever intentionally does any of the following may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 2:
(1) obstructs, hinders, or prevents the lawful execution of any legal process, civil or criminal, or apprehension of another on a charge or conviction of a criminal offense;
(2) obstructs, resists, or interferes with a peace officer while the officer is engaged in the performance of official duties;
(3) interferes with or obstructs a firefighter while the firefighter is engaged in the performance of official duties;
(4) interferes with or obstructs a member of an ambulance service personnel crew, … providing, or attempting to provide, emergency care; …

Minn. Stat. § 609.50 (2025)

The most common fact pattern where this statute is charged involves a police officer attempting to detain or arrest a person, and that person, or others obstruct, interfere, resist, or attempt to prevent that detention or arrest. Another common setting is a protest. More on protester cases below.

Given the wording of the statute, we may ask:

• Was the execution of any legal process, such as arrest, lawful?
• Was the police officer is engaged in lawful performance of official duties?
• Did the person accused actually obstruct, hinder, prevent, resist, or interfere with anything?
• If the person accused used force, was that use of force unintentional or lawful self-defense?
• Without the benefit of hindsight, what did the person accused perceive at the time?

These defenses are specific to this statute. Of course, the prosecution bears a burden to bring evidence on each and every element required for criminal liability, including jurisdiction, identity, criminal intent, and criminal act. And other defenses could apply as well.

Obstruction: Common Fact Issues & FAQs

FAQ: “What are common legal issues in protester cases?” I see some recurring issues in protester cases. First, a key issue relates to the behavior of the group, as a group. If outsiders see the group as a whole to be violent, with destruction of property or threats of violence, this could affect how police view an individual within the group. Of course, individuals are not criminally liable for the behavior of others, outside of participation in a group crime (inchoate crime) like conspiracy. And a common related issue is the identity of the peaceful individual vs. others engaging in illegal conduct. My articles on Riot and Inchoate (Group) Crimes, discuss these issues in depth (see the menu or bottom of this page for links to those pages).

A second issue in protester cases is the line between peaceful protest, protected by the First Amendment, vs. criminal conduct such such as damage to property or threats of violence or violent acts against persons. Here again the group vs. individual identity is important. Can a violent crowd taint a peaceful individual?

FAQ: “What is the difference between resisting and obstructing?” The statute’s language, quoted above, uses several words as alternatives to describe the prohibited conduct that could apply to a police contact: “obstructs, hinders, or prevents” and “obstructs, resists, or interferes with a peace officer.” And its language in relation to firefighters, ambulance personnel, etc. is “interferes with or obstructs.” So, depending upon the subparagraph charged, the difference between “resisting and obstructing” might not matter.

What does matter, is whether any proven facts fit the words used in the charging statute. For example, in cases involving peace officers, if the facts show that the words “obstructs, resists, or interferes with” fit, then the accused person may face a charge under Minn. Stat. § 609.50, Subd. 1 (2). But then it wouldn’t matter which, whether obstruction, resisting, or interference, since alternatively, that element of the crime may be proven if any one of those words fit the facts.

FAQ: “What exactly is resisting arrest?” The jury or other ultimate fact-finder decides. But we can point to factors that may bear on that decision. Did the person do anything voluntarily (intentionally) to resist a lawful arrest? Was the alleged conduct active (physically doing something) or was it passive (not doing something)? Should the person have somehow known that whatever they did was resisting a lawful arrest? Did the police officer put the person on notice by giving some kind of verbal warning? Did the person intentionally use force or cause injury to a police officer?

Was the alleged conduct fleeing or escape (not resisting)? See, State v. Krawsky, 426 NW2d 875, 877 (Minn. 1988) (stating that the language of the obstruction-of-legal-process “statute is directed solely at physical acts” and “forbids intentional physical obstruction or interference with a police officer in the performance of his official duties”).

Finally, the state argues that the 1989 amendment adding “obstructs” and “resists” to the term “interferes” broadened the reach of the statute so as to include fleeing a police officer. We disagree. “Obstructs” and “resists” are terms that, at least in the context of the duties police officers perform, connote physical activity directed at the officer even more strongly than does the term “interferes.” See generally State v. Wick, 331 N.W.2d 769, 771 (Minn.1983) (equating the verb “resist” with “assaultive conduct”).”

State v. Morin, 736 NW2d 691 (Minn. Court of Appeals 2007)

FAQ: “Is yelling alone resisting arrest?” That would be a jury issue. But we would not normally view words alone, that are not threats and do not equate to physical interference, as resisting arrest. I discuss words vs. conduct more below.

As a defense attorney over almost 40 years the majority of cases I’ve handled where the Defendant was facing Obstructing Legal Process (or Interference with a Peace Officer) charges have one common characteristic. A police officer was in the process of using force to effect an arrest. And the Defendant, upon being physically hit or struck upon his body, reacted instinctively by pulling away or recoiling from the blow. Sometimes the police officer misperceives that pulling away or recoiling from the physical pain of being hit on some body part, as being obstructing or resisting arrest. But this is an involuntary reaction to “pain compliance,” not an intentional use of force.

Another, less common fact pattern has been where in response to police conduct that the Defendant perceived as aggressive and threatening, the fearful Defendant actually uses affirmative, intentional force against the police officer, with the subjective intent of self-defense not resisting arrest.

In a third scenario, a friend or bystander may try “Obstructing Legal Process” (Interference with a Peace Officer) by attempting to prevent the arrest of another person; and get arrested themselves as a result.

And alcohol is sometimes a factor that we must take into account.

A related issue is whether the police officer’s attempt to detain or arrest was lawful. This issue is often perceived in vastly different ways, depending upon your perspective – that of the police officer; or that of the citizen targeted. More on that below.

Arrest vs. Lawful Police Order

Though the most common fact pattern involves arrest, some cases involved a “lawful police order.” In State v. Occhino, 572 NW2d 316 (Minn. Court of Appeals 1997), the defendant had refused repeated requests to leave the police office, then physically resisted police officers physically ejecting him from the premises. His trespassing and obstruction of legal process convictions were upheld on appeal. But note that even in this case, there was intentional physical conduct by the defendant. (And note the trespass fact-pattern, including knowledge proved by warning.)

Unlawful Arrest as a Defense to Obstruction

Complete defense: Historically, unlawful arrest was a complete defense to a criminal obstruction, resisting arrest, or interference with a peace officer charge. Some states recognize a limited right to resist an unlawful arrest (i.e., no warrant, no probable cause). But unlawful arrest is not a complete defense in Minnesota today, where the law requires compliance at the time, even if an arrest lacks probable cause, with the expectation that legal challenges might be handled fairly in court later.

Partial defense: Yet it is still an issue that can excuse or mitigate such a criminal charge in Minnesota. The defense of an illegality of an arrest, against an obstruction resisting, or interference charge evolved from a recognized common-law right to a significantly restricted or abolished defense in many modern jurisdictions.  State v. Smith, nonprec. A11-1686 (Minn. Court of Appeals 2012) (“Because Smith was charged with obstructing legal process as a result of resisting arrest, the state had to prove that Officer Barrett had a basis for arresting Smith.”)

Common Law Origins: The common law rule is that a person does have a right to resist an unlawful arrest. Under English and early American common law, an individual had a legal right to use reasonable force to resist an unlawful arrest. An illegal arrest was viewed as a provocation that could justify an assault on the officer. The 1710 English case The Queen v. Tooley, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B. 1710) (“if anyone against the law imprison a man, he is an offender”), established the right to resist, including the right of third parties to intervene against illegal arrests.

In 1900, the U.S. Supreme Court in John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 US 529 (1900), affirmed this common-law right, granting a new trial to a man who killed an officer attempting a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor. The U.S. Supreme Court recited this rule of law: “If the officer had no right to arrest, the other party might resist the illegal attempt to arrest him, using no more force than was absolutely necessary to repel the assault constituting the attempt to arrest.”

Rise of Government Power vs. Individual Rights: The resistance rule of the common law has been degraded in the United States. The States adhering to the resistance right have declined since the 1958 promulgation of the Model Penal Code by the American Law Institute (A.L.I.). According to the Model Penal Code: “The use of force is not justifiable to resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, although the arrest is unlawful.” The A.L.I.’s comment on this digression from existing law stated it “should be possible to provide adequate remedies against illegal arrest,” like civil tort actions by the arrestee against the officer or administrative review of police conduct. But since then, experience shows that their stated hope, 60 years ago, was misplaced. Courts generally have been ineffective in reigning in unlawful arrests.

Minnesota’s obstruction statute, though changed over the years in many respects, did not change to incorporate the Model Penal Code’s suggestion to criminalize resistance of unlawful arrest. Compare the current version above, quite similar to the 1945 version of the Minnesota Statute:

“INTERFERING WITH PUBLIC OFFICERS. Every person who, by means of any threat or violence, shall attempt to deter or prevent any executive or administrative officer from performing any duty imposed upon him by law, or who shall knowingly resist, by use of force or violence, any executive or administrative officer in the performance of his duty, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.”

Minn. Stat. § 613.17 (1945) (Repealed)

But in the 1960s, to some extent many other U.S. states did abrogate by statute, the common law right to resist illegal arrests. Some legal scholars and legislators argued against individual rights as “self-help;” that “allowing” people to resist illegal arrest physically was dangerous.

In Minnesota today, no statute or court decision explicitly abrogates the common law right to resist an unlawful arrest or police command. But on the other hand, no Minnesota appellate court decisions since the 1950s reaffirm it. As a result, in Minnesota, even though an arrest is tainted and unlawful, a prosecutor may still file a criminal charge with the Court for the act of resisting an unlawful arrest. Of course, the jury is ultimate decider of fact and of the law in criminal cases, at a jury trial.

In the Minnesota Court of Appeals case, State v. Atlas, nonprec. A05-674 (Minn. Court of Appeals 2007), the court noted: “Atlas has failed to show any authority that self-defense is available to a charge of obstructing legal process or that she has any right or privilege to resist an ostensibly lawful arrest.” But the court did not note any Minnesota authority that a person does not have a right or privilege to resist an unlawful arrest.

Where a state legislatively abrogates the common law resistance right, typically it has an explicit statutory provision under the justification that a person is “not authorized” to use force in resisting a known officer. See, People v. Locken, 59 Ill. 2d 459 (1974) (Ill. Criminal Code provides: “A person is not authorized to use force to resist an arrest which he knows is being made … by a police officer … even if … the arrest in fact is unlawful.”)

But In contrast to Illinois courts, New York courts ruled that a lawful arrest is a necessary element (precondition) of resisting arrest, even though their statute provides that a person “may not use physical force to resist arrest, whether authorized or unauthorized.” The substantive scope of the resisting arrest offense includes a requirement: “an authorized arrest is an indispensable element of a resisting arrest offense.” People v. Ailey, 350 N.Y.S.2d 981, 989 (N.Y. City Ct. 1974). That crime does not occur if the arrest is illegal or unlawful. New York courts have concluded that the arrest must in fact be one that is authorized by the rules of arrest. Absent a lawful warrant or probable cause, the arresting officer is neither effecting an “authorized arrest,” nor “performing a lawful duty.”

Turning again to the two most relevant provisions of Minnesota’s statute, we might distinguish police officers vs. anyone:

• Lawfulness of execution of legal process by anyone. Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(1) (“lawful execution of any legal process, civil or criminal, or apprehension of another”); and
• A peace officer’s performance of official duties. Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2) (“with a peace officer while the officer is engaged in the performance of official duties”).

But this distinction disappears, because an officer has no duty to make an unlawful arrest, the statute excludes unlawful arrests from its definition of “official duties.” Note this could be important in cases charging fourth-degree assault of a peace officer, Minn. Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 1(b) (physical assault a peace officer when “effecting a lawful arrest or executing any other duty imposed by law.”)

Why? In such a case, if there was no lawful arrest, but the Defendant did assault a police officer, then the defendant would be innocent of the fourth-degree assault of a peace officer charge, though guilty of some other assault charge that would apply to anyone, whether a police officer or not (peace officer not an element of the other crime).

So we can distinguish between two distinct and separate issues:

1. “Did the person have a legal right to physically resist arrest?,” vs.
2. “Can the prosecutor prove that the peace officer’s actions were “lawful” or was “engaged in the performance of official duties?”

We should be aware of this distinction and avoid conflating the two. In other words, even if the person did not have a legal right to physically resist arrest in Minnesota, the government still is required to at least prove the peace officer’s actions were “lawful” and was “engaged in the performance of official duties.” After all, the rationale behind stripping people of our traditional, common law right to physically resist illegal arrests and searches, was that we could safely rely upon sorting it out later in court.

And, lawfulness of the arrest also goes to the state of mind of the accused. In other words, the lawfulness of the arrest is unavoidably embedded and entangled within the intent of the defendant. Criminal intent is discussed below.

Elements: “Lawful Execution” vs. “Official Duties”

The Minnesota Court of Appeals addresses the difference between the statutory elements “lawful execution” vs. “official duties” in State v. Conlin, nonprec. A14-0069 (Minn. Court of Appeals 2014). In that case the court held that evidence was sufficient that appellant obstructed, resisted, and interfered with peace officers in the performance of their duties, saying:

“Appellant argues that the evidence was not sufficient to show that his conduct when the peace officers came to his building to execute a search warrant violated Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2), by ‘obstruct[ing], resist[ing], or interfer[ing] with a peace officer while the officer [was] engaged in the performance of official duties.’ He argues further that he should have been charged under Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(1) (prohibiting ‘obstruct[ing], hinder[ing], or prevent[ing] the lawful execution of any legal process’) because the peace officers were executing a search warrant. But an officer executing a search warrant is engaged in the performance of official duties; the two are not mutually exclusive. While Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(1), applies to anyone, including peace officers, who is lawfully executing a legal process, Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2), applies to any peace officer who is performing an official duty, including executing a legal process. …

Appellant relies on Pedersen, 840 N.W.2d at 438 (… reversing the individual’s conviction under Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(1), because no legal process was involved). But Pederson is distinguishable: the execution of a search warrant is part of the legal process, while the investigation of a report of a possible assault is not.”

State v. Conlin, nonprec. A14-0069 (Minn. Court of Appeals 2014)

And in one case, the Defendant was guilty of assaulting a police officer, but not-guilty of obstructing legal process. The Minnesota court of Appeals in State v. Pederson, 840 NW2d 433 (Minn. Court of Appeals 2013), distinguished between the two separate and distinct crimes articulated in Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(1) (“lawful execution of any legal process, civil or criminal, or apprehension of another”) vs. Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2) (“with a peace officer while the officer is engaged in the performance of official duties”).

The court then analyzed statutory construction and meaning:

“The state maintains that, despite the reorganization, the focus of the statute remains the nature of the defendant’s conduct, not the nature of police duties that are being disrupted. … But these cases do not address the issue presented here: whether a person may be found to have violated subdivision 1(1) if that person’s conduct obstructs duties that do not relate to the execution of legal process.

‘An amendment to a statute is generally presumed to change the law.’ State v. Tanksley, 809 NW2d 706, 711 n. 5 (Minn. 2012) … We may presume that the 1989 amendment to the obstructing-legal-process statute, which added language and reorganized the statute, changed the law by specifically defining the nature of the official function that must be disrupted in order to support a conviction under each subdivision. Id.; … In addition, adopting the state’s interpretation of the amended statute would essentially render meaningless the articulated distinction between police duties that must be obstructed for a conviction under subdivision 1(1) and subdivision 1(2), respectively. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (‘Every law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.’).

In this case, although appellant’s actions interfered with police investigation of a possible domestic assault, the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct hindered, obstructed, or interfered with legal process, or the apprehension of another person on a charge or conviction, which is required for a conviction of subdivision 1(1). See Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(1). When appellant assaulted the officer, the police were not serving process on her or another person in the apartment, no legal action was pending, and they were not attempting to make an arrest. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence does not sustain appellant’s conviction of obstructing legal process under Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(1), and we reverse that conviction.”

State v. Pederson, 840 NW 2d 433 (Minn. Court of Appeals 2013)

However, let’s consider a case where a court finds probable cause (surviving a probable cause challenge before and during trial) to support both Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(1) (“lawful execution of any legal process, … or apprehension of another” by anyone) and Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2) (“with a peace officer while the officer is engaged in the performance of official duties”). The Minnesota Supreme Court considered such a case in State v. Ihle, 640 NW2d 910 (Minn. Supreme Court 2002):

“if the statute establishes alternative means for satisfying an element, unanimity on the means is not required. That is, a jury cannot convict unless it unanimously finds that the government has proved each element of the offense; however the jury need not always decide unanimously which of several possible means the defendant used to commit the offense in order to conclude that an element has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

State v. Ihle, 640 NW2d 910 (Minn. Supreme Court 2002)

In that case the appellant had not objected to the jury instructions at the time they were given. On appeal, appellant argued that his conviction was the product of plain error that affected his substantial rights because the jury instructions for obstruction failed to adequately distinguish between legal behavior and illegal behavior. The court held that because the jury instructions were not defective regarding the requirement for a unanimous jury, the district court did not err.

What does this mean? It means that of the two ways the statute provides a person can be guilty of obstruction (“lawful execution of any legal process” by anyone or “peace officer while the officer is engaged in the performance of official duties”), if the jury is asked to consider both, the jury need not say which in the verdict. But the statute and court opinion make clear that they are two, separate and district crimes requiring different proof of facts.

Cases Not Involving a “Peace Officer”

We can divide the types of obstruction, resisting and interference cases into two broad categories. Those involving a:

1. Peace officer, firefighter, member of an ambulance service personnel crew, employee of the Department of Revenue, Department of Public Safety Driver and Vehicle Services Division, a driver’s license agent appointed under section 171.061, or a deputy registrar; or,
2. Anyone lawful executing any legal process, civil or criminal, or apprehending another on a charge or conviction of a criminal offense.

For the first category above, some of those statutory terms used in this section include a statutory definition. But the term “peace officer” is not defined in the statute, or even within all of Chapter 609. The term is defined in other statutes, and may have a common meaning. But as a result, the term may require statutory construction analysis, it it’s important to a given case.

However as a practical matter, given the second category above, in most fact patterns we are likely to see it won’t matter. Why? Because a prosecutor can use this criminal statute to charge obstruction, resisting and interference with anyone lawfully executing any legal process, or apprehending another on a charge or conviction of a criminal offense. That could include, for example a bail bond recovery agent (bounty hunter), a retail security guard, bar bouncer, a private process server, any government security employee or neighborhood watch group, that does not fit the statutory definition of “peace officer.”

And this could also include U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Officers, federal agents or Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Agents, etc. Keep in mind that although the main topic of this article is Minnesota law, federal laws do apply in Minnesota. And federal law enforcement officers may enforce federal laws.

Yet when I analyze a case, we need to break down whether the facts being claimed fit the letter of the law under all the applicable statutes, and cases. Often through a process of deductive logic, we can eliminate the prosecution case, piece by piece until nothing left remains.

FAQ: “What About Arrests by ICE?”

Apart from whether federal ICE law enforcement officers fit various the Minnesota Statutes definitions of “peace officer,” “public officer,” etc., some Minnesota Statutes explicitly grant police powers under state law to them. When it comes to arrest powers, in addition to whatever arrest powers they have in Minnesota under federal law, they also have:

Subd. 2. “An officer in the United States Customs and Border Protection or the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services may arrest a person without a warrant under the circumstances specified in clauses (1) and (2):
(1) when the officer is on duty within the scope of assignment and one or more of the following situations exist:
(i) the person commits an assault in the fifth degree, as defined in section 609.224, against the officer;
(ii) the person commits an assault in the fifth degree, as defined in section 609.224, on any other person in the presence of the officer, or commits any felony;
(iii) the officer has reasonable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and reasonable cause to believe that the person committed it; or
(iv) the officer has received positive information by written, teletypic, telephonic, radio, or other authoritative source that a peace officer holds a warrant for the person’s arrest; or
(2) when the assistance of the officer has been requested by another Minnesota law enforcement agency.”

Minn. Stat. § 629.34 ARREST MAY BE MADE WITHOUT WARRANT

And this bears on whether an arrest was lawful or “while the officer is engaged in the performance of official duties,” both elements of the crimes of obstruction, interference, and resisting arrest.

Other Defenses to Obstruction Charges

Scope – words vs conduct: In State v. Krawsky, 426 NW2d 875 (Minn. 1988), Krawsky argued the obstruction-interference statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The court did not explicitly hold that it was unconstitutional, but instead narrowly construed the statute, holding that it required the state to prove that the defendant acted intentionally; and that the statute was directed only at words and acts that have the effect of physically obstructing or interfering with a police officer. “However, the statute does not apply to ordinary verbal criticism directed at a police officer even while the officer is performing his official duties and does not apply to the mere act of interrupting an officer, even intentionally.” State v. Krawsky, 426 NW2d 875, 878 (Minn. Supreme Court 1988).

“The statute prohibits only intentional physical acts or fighting or other words that have the effect of physically obstructing or interfering with a police officer in the performance of her duties.” …

“The statute may be used to punish ‘fighting words’ or any other words that by themselves have the effect of physically obstructing or interfering with a police officer in the performance of his duties—e.g., the statute may be used to punish a person who runs beside an officer pursuing a felon in a public street shouting and cursing at the officer if the shouting and cursing physically obstructs the officer’s pursuit and if the person intends by his conduct to obstruct or interfere with the officer.”

State v. Ihle, 640 NW 2d 910, 915 (Minn. Supreme Court 2002)

The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed a conviction based on alleged interference-obstructing legal process by being argumentative with a police officer by interrupting him while he was talking to Defendant, by exiting her car and not complying with the officer’s orders to get back in the car, and by emptying the contents of her purse onto the ground. State v. Yackel, nonprec. A15-0311 (Minn. Court of Appeals 2016).

And the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the reversal of a conviction where the Defendant had lied to police, obstructing their investigation. “In order for a violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(1) or (2) to exist, there must be a finding that the accused physically obstructed or interfered with a police officer while that officer was engaged in the performance of his official duties.” State v. Tomlin, 622 NW2d 546 (Minn. Supreme Court 2001).

Even in states like Minnesota where unlawful arrest may not always be a complete defense, the fact of an unlawful arrest can support other defense issues. Minnesota’s obstruction-interference statute requires that the police officer be lawfully performing their duties. If an arrest is illegal, we can argue the officer was not acting within the scope of their official duties.

If a police officer uses excessive or unreasonable force during an illegal (or even legal) arrest, you may have a right to use “reasonable and proportional force” in lawful self-defense, to protect yourself from injury. Self-defense is essentially saying “yes, I resisted arrest, but it was justified because the police officer used excessive force requiring me to respond reasonably and proportionately.”

And the First Amendment may serve as a defense against obstruction-interference charges for peaceful protester cases or activities like filming police or exercising free speech.

Intent Element

Did the person accused intend to do the conduct prohibited by the statute? In other words, is evidence of criminal intent lacking?

To be convicted of obstruction-interference, the defendant must have “intentionally,” willfully or knowingly intended to interfere. Challenging the legality of the arrest can sometimes help show that the defendant’s actions were a reaction to confusion or perceived danger rather than a specific intent to obstruct. And flinching in response the use of force by a police officer to effect an arrest is not intentional.

The Minnesota Supreme Court mentions the requirement of an intent element in State v. Krawsky, 426 NW2d 875 (Minn. Supreme Court 1988):

“First, the statute requires the state to prove that the defendant acted “intentionally.” … However, although not sufficient by itself to save the statute, the provision of an intent element is obviously a necessary precondition to a determination that the statute is not facially overbroad.”

State v. Krawsky, 426 NW2d 875 (Minn. Supreme Court 1988)

Is Obstruction a Specific Intent Crime in Minnesota?

Minnesota’s Obstruction-Interference statute criminalizes conduct that is done “intentionally.” Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1. Therefore, the obstruction crime defined by under section 609.50 is a specific-intent offense. Specific-intent crimes require the government to prove that the accused person had an intent to cause a particular result. Compare that to General-intent offenses which only require the government to prove that the defendant intentionally engaged in the conduct prohibited by the statute.

Currently we have no binding (“published”) Minnesota appellate court precedent on whether obstruction-interference under section 609.50 is a specific or general-intent offense. One Minnesota Court of Appeals panel recently said in a nonprecedential decision that obstruction under section 609.50 is a general-intent offense. State v. Sprowls, No. A24-1584 (Minn. App. July 21, 2025).

But another panel of the Minnesota Court of Appeals more recently “assumed without deciding” in another nonprecedential decision, that obstruction is a specific-intent offense. State v. Vialard, No. A24-1222 (Minn. App. Aug 18, 2025). And the Minnesota Court of Appeals said in State v. Burr, nonprec. A11-2202 (Minn. Court of Appeals 2012):

“The plain language of the statute prohibits acts committed for the purpose of resisting or obstructing officers in the performance of their official duties. Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1 (“Whoever intentionally does any of the following . . .” (emphasis added)); see Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(3) (2010) (defining “intentionally” as a mental state in which “the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act performed by the actor, if successful, will cause that result.”)”

State v. Burr, nonprec. A11-2202 (Minn. Court of Appeals 2012)

So one day the Minnesota Supreme Court may weigh in to remove any question.

My view is that the current obstruction-interference statute’s language must be applied, as it is written. It is a specific intent crime, requiring the prosecuting attorney to prove that the person intended to cause a particular result.

Penalties for Obstruction, Resisting & Interference

FAQ: “What is the maximum penalty for resisting arrest or interference?” The statute provides for three different offense levels, felony, gross misdemeanor and misdemeanor. Minn. Stat. § 609.50, Subd. 2.

Felony: If the person had reason to know that the alleged act created a risk of, or caused death, substantial bodily harm, or serious property damage; then the crime if proven, carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for not more than five years or up to $10,000 fine or both.

Gross misdemeanor: If the alleged act was accompanied by force or violence or the threat thereof, the maximum penalty is not more than 364 days county jail or up to a $3,000 fine or both.

Misdemeanor: In other cases, the maximum penalty is up to 90 days jail or up to $1,000 fine or both.

People who have been convicted almost never get the statutory maximum penalty. But not only is it good to know the theoretical upper limit on punishment, the maximum lock up time can also tell us the maximum period of probation possible.

Defense attorneys first look for ways to clear the person accused entirely, with dismissal or acquittal. Next we look for ways to mitigate, get some charges dismissed, and reduce the penalty.

Criminal cases have two stages, at the trial court level. In the first the court (judge) decides whether criminal liability will attach (“conviction,” after a guilty plea or verdict). And if it does (or by agreement), then the court has sentencing (or dispositional) jurisdiction. At a sentencing hearing (or dispositional hearing) the defense attorney can ask the judge for a fair and just sentence, and point to supportive facts.

Use of Force in Obstructing or Resisting

A person who uses force against a law enforcement officer in obstructing or resisting arrest puts themselves at greater risk that the law enforcement officer will respond with a higher level of force to effect the arrest or in self-defense of law enforcement officers. That should go without saying. And of course, one should avoid doing that if reasonably possible.

But the reality is, in many obstruction and resisting arrest cases the defendant did not in fact use force, at least not consciously or voluntarily. Every person will flinch or pull away upon receiving a blow, involuntarily.

Penalties more severe based on force: The punishments provision of the statute makes risk of “death, substantial bodily harm, or serious property damage” a felony; makes use of “force or violence or the threat thereof” a gross misdemeanor; and makes obstruction of legal process, resisting arrest, or interference with a peace officer, a simple misdemeanor (lesser crime) in all other circumstances.

So a prosecutor can use Minnesota’s current obstruction of legal process statute to charge in situations where they claim the Defendant used force, as well as situations where the use of force is not one of their claims.

Severity level of the criminal charge is not the only way the use of force is important, however.

If the Defendant did use force against a police officer, then we may consider whether that use of force was lawful self-defense. When a person accused of a crime asserts lawful self-defense, they are admitting that they used force, but asserting that it was lawful, justified under the law, and so there was no crime.

See my comprehensive legal guide: Self-Defense Laws in Minnesota.

Note that an unintentional flinching or recoiling from blows by police making a forceful arrest would not be intentional use of force by the Defendant. That would be a different defense, focusing on lack of criminal intent. And those two defenses are mutually exclusive (at least as to a single moment), so the defense should pick one (not both). (Self-defense is the intentional use of force, justified in the circumstances.)

And as with every criminal case, the law requires us to look at events through the eyes of the person accused, not the police officer or others present. Without the benefit of hindsight, what did the person accused reasonably perceive at the time? For example, did that person know, or should they have reasonably known given the circumstances at that moment, that a police officer wanted them to submit to lawful detention or arrest?

Hill argues his resistance cannot be the basis of probable cause to believe he committed the crime of obstruction of legal process because he had a right to resist the arrest. In Minnesota, there is a right to resist an unjustified bodily attack (a.k.a. excessive force) by an officer, but there is no right to resist an unlawful search or arrest. State v. Kutchara, 350 N.W.2d 924, 927 (Minn. 1984); State v. Wick, 331 N.W.2d 769, 771 (Minn.1983). Hill had a right to resist only if Pavlak’s and Pierce’s use of force was improper or excessive.

Hill v. Scott, 349 F3d 1068 (8th Circuit, US Court of Appeals 2003)

Suppression of Evidence After Intervening New Crime

If police get evidence illegally, from an illegal seizure, search or otherwise, a court will not allow them to profit from their crime, and will suppress that illegally obtained evidence. That means the prosecutor cannot use that poisoned evidence at the trial. But if the defendant later resists illegal conduct by police, the Minnesota courts now say that he or she “commits a new crime;” and that “new crime” means police and prosecutors get to use that illegally obtained evidence of interference after all. This extended quote from the Minnesota Court of Appeals explains:

“Controlling precedent from the Minnesota Supreme Court and from our court holds that evidence of a defendant committing a new crime in response to unconstitutional police conduct—such as fleeing police, resisting arrest, or assaulting a police officer—constitutes intervening circumstances that purge the subsequent conduct from the taint of the unlawful seizure. See, e.g., City of St. Louis Park v. Berg, 433 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Minn. 1988) (rejecting ‘the contention that evidence of a defendant’s resistance to an illegal arrest must be suppressed as forbidden fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation by the police’); … State v. Ingram, 570 N.W.2d 173, 178-79 (Minn. App. 1997) (noting that ‘evidence of a crime committed in response to an illegal police arrest or search is not suppressed as the fruit of the prior illegality,’ and concluding that ‘[d]espite the illegality of the initial police search and seizure, Ingram’s flight from the police was an act of free will sufficient to purge the police illegality of its primary taint’). The supreme court has concluded that a defendant may not resort to ‘self-help’ to resolve disputes concerning unreasonable searches and seizures because the legal safeguards under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments provide ‘the victim of an unlawful search with realistic and orderly legal alternatives to physical resistance.’ State v. Hoagland, 270 N.W.2d 778, 780-81 (Minn. 1978).”

State v. Engel, 18 NW2d 540 (Minn. Court of Appeals 2025)

However, police should not be allowed to manipulate a situation to cover up illegal police conduct resulting in evidence. If police officers provoke resistive conduct, then evidence of that interference or resistive conduct should be suppressed by a court. See, City of St. Louis Park v. Berg, 433 NW2d 87, 91 (Minn. Supreme Court 1988) (concluding that evidence of the defendant’s resistive conduct was properly allowed because there was no evidence that officers had provoked the defendant into committing a new crime of resisting arrest).

The law in this area should be changed to restore the common law rule, by legislation and by the courts. But for now, we need to be aware of it.

Associated Charges

Sometimes an Obstructing Legal Process (or Resisting Arrest or Interference with a Peace Officer) charge is the only and sole count in the Complaint. But sometimes it is one of several. Some other commonly associated criminal charges include:

• Fleeing Police (In a Motor Vehicle or Other Than Vehicle), Minn. Stat. § 609.487
• False name, age, or ID to police, Minn. Stat. § 609.506
• Trespass, Minn. Stat. § 609.605, subd. 1(b)(3)
• Carry Pistol Over 0.04, Minn. Stat. § 624.7142
• Threats of Violence, Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1
• Disorderly Conduct, Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1
• Riot, Minn. Stat. § 609.71
• Inchoate and Group Crimes: Attempt, Solicit, Aid, Conspiracy, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 609.17, subd. 1
• Violation of Order for Protection (OFP), Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, Subd. 14
• Fifth-degree assault, Minn. Stat. § 609.224
• DWI, Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1
• Refusal to Submit to Search for Chemical Test, Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2
• Fourth-degree assault of a peace officer, Minn. Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 1(b) (physical assault a peace officer when “effecting a lawful arrest or executing any other duty imposed by law.”*

*Note that “The elements of the two offenses are different. Fourth-degree assault [of a peace officer] requires the intentional infliction of bodily harm; whereas, obstructing legal process requires physical obstruction, resistance, or interference with the officer in the performance of his duties.” State v. Dodds, nonprec. A08-0261 (Minn. Court of Appeals 2009).

Question? Call Attorney Thomas Gallagher, 612 333-1500

A good criminal defense lawyer knows the law and how it can help you with your Obstructing Legal Process, Resisting Arrest, or Interference with a Peace Officer case. These are legal problems and we can find legal solutions. If you have a question about one of these cases, or want to discuss yours, call Attorney Thomas Gallagher.

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